As Washington speaks of “ceasefires” and “de‑escalation”, fresh naval deployments near the Strait of Hormuz revive an old question: who really threatens the free flow of energy – the coastal state or the distant power projecting force from thousands of miles away?
In recent days, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and several Western media outlets have highlighted renewed naval activity near the Strait of Hormuz. Guided‑missile destroyers, such as the USS Frank E. Petersen Jr. and others, are presented as guardians of “freedom of navigation” and “secure sea lanes” in one of the world’s most vital energy chokepoints.
The narrative is familiar: a heavily armed U.S. naval presence is portrayed as a stabilizing force, while Iran – the coastal state whose shores define the very geometry of the Strait – is cast as the main source of risk.
Yet a closer look at both international law and the empirical record of the past four decades suggests a very different reading.
1. Sovereignty, Geography and Law: Iran Is Not a “Guest” in the Strait of Hormuz
The Strait of Hormuz is not an abstract line on a map. It is bordered by Iran and Oman, whose territorial waters and airspace are directly affected by any foreign military buildup. Under the UN Charter and customary international law, these states enjoy sovereign rights and bear primary responsibility for security in their adjacent waters.
Iran has consistently affirmed two principles:
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The free flow of energy and commercial shipping is in Iran’s own national interest.
As a major energy producer and a country deeply integrated into regional trade, Tehran does not benefit from chaos in the Strait.
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Security must be regional, not outsourced.
Extra‑regional coalitions led by the United States have historically imported geostrategic rivalries into the Gulf, turning local waters into arenas of military competition.
From a legal and geographic standpoint, it is difficult to argue that the coastal state, defending its shores and sea lines, is the primary “intruder” – while a distant power, deploying aircraft carriers and guided‑missile destroyers from thousands of miles away, is the natural “protector” of global trade.
2. The Pattern of Pressure: Military Moves in the Shadow of Negotiations
Iranian officials and analysts often point to a recurring pattern in U.S. behavior:
- When diplomatic tracks or negotiations involving Iran gain momentum,
- Washington simultaneously increases military pressure – through sanctions, new deployments, or shows of force near Iran’s borders.
This dual‑track approach sends mixed signals: on the one hand, the language of dialogue and “de‑escalation”; on the other, the reality of naval buildups and exercises in sensitive waterways like the Strait of Hormuz.
From Tehran’s perspective, such moves are not neutral. They are read as attempts to:
- Shape the negotiating environment through coercive leverage,
- Test Iran’s red lines and reaction thresholds,
- And reassure U.S. regional partners by demonstrating that military escalation always remains on the table.
It is therefore unsurprising that Iranian decision‑makers insist on maintaining strong defensive and deterrent capabilities. In an environment where “trust” has been repeatedly eroded – from the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA to decades of sanctions and covert operations – deterrence is seen not as a luxury, but as a necessity for survival.
3. Deterrence vs. Escalation: Iran’s Right to Self‑Defence
Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, every state has the inherent right of individual or collective self‑defence if an armed attack occurs. Beyond this minimal threshold, international jurisprudence and state practice also recognize the legitimacy of proportionate defensive postures in the face of persistent external threats.
Iran’s approach in the Strait of Hormuz can be summarized in three points:
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Defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity
Iran has repeatedly declared that it will not initiate conflict in the Strait. However, it reserves the right to respond decisively to any act of aggression or violation of its territorial waters.
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Deterrence as a stabilizing factor
By maintaining credible defensive capabilities – naval, missile and anti‑access/area‑denial (A2/AD) systems – Iran seeks to raise the cost of any unilateral military adventure by outside powers. Deterrence, in this sense, is aimed at preventing war, not provoking it.
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Opposition to selective interpretations of “freedom of navigation”
The principle of freedom of navigation is often invoked selectively. While Iran supports lawful commercial traffic for all states, it rejects the use of this principle as a cover for military encirclement, intelligence gathering and coercive operations by forces that have no direct territorial stake in the region.
Thus, when Iranian officials state that “our finger is on the trigger”, the message is not a threat of aggression, but a reminder that Iran will not accept to be a passive observer of its own encirclement.
4. Who Really Threatens Energy Security?
From Asia to Europe and Africa, many states depend on the uninterrupted flow of energy through the Strait of Hormuz. For them, the central question is practical: which policy is more likely to guarantee long‑term stability?
- A security architecture built with the main coastal state, Iran, based on dialogue, confidence‑building and respect for sovereignty; or
- A revolving door of external military coalitions, whose presence often coincides with crises, miscalculations and the risk of confrontation?
The historical record offers important clues. Episodes of heightened tension in the Strait – from the 1980s “Tanker War” to more recent standoffs – have overwhelmingly involved the projection of military power from outside the region. Each time, the narrative of “protecting shipping” has accompanied deployments that, in practice, increased the risk of incidents.
For the international community, particularly energy importers in East Asia and Europe, the policy choice is becoming clearer: sustainable security in the Strait of Hormuz requires recognizing Iran as a central, legitimate actor, not as a problem to be bypassed through military pressure.
5. Towards a Fairer Security Discourse
The current coverage of U.S. naval moves near the Strait once again reveals a deeper asymmetry in global discourse:
- When Western warships move closer to Iranian shores, the action is framed as responsible “policing” of global commons.
- When Iran strengthens its coastal defences or asserts control over its own maritime approaches, the same space is portrayed as a zone of “Iranian aggression”.
A more balanced approach would:
- Acknowledge Iran’s legitimate security concerns and legal rights as a littoral state;
- Critically examine the risks inherent in permanent military deployments by extra‑regional powers;
- Encourage regional dialogue formats that place coastal states – including Iran – at the center of any long‑term arrangement for the security of the Strait of Hormuz.
For Iran, the equation is straightforward: no durable stability in this vital waterway can be built against Iran; it must be built with Iran.
Closing Paragraph
As the world confronts overlapping crises – from energy insecurity to new wars – the Strait of Hormuz will remain a strategic focal point. The choice before the international community is not between “U.S. protection” and “Iranian threat”, as popular narratives often suggest. It is between a militarized corridor shaped by distant powers and a cooperative security architecture rooted in regional ownership and international law.
Iran has repeatedly signaled that it prefers the latter, while maintaining the means to resist the former. Recognizing this dual reality – Iran’s vulnerability to pressure and its right to credible defence – is essential for any serious attempt to prevent new escalations in one of the world’s most sensitive waterways.